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I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, a debate has been raging within religious circles: now that science
has provided consumers with ways to avoid pregnancy, is utilization of these
methods interference with God’s will? Each denomination and sect has a different
answer to that question, but some religious groups, in their context as employers,
441
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have resisted legislation that mandates insurance coverage of prescription
contraceptives because they believe that being required to provide these services is a
violation of their First Amendment right to religious free exercise.1 States have
attempted to remedy this issue through legislative conscience clauses that exempt
religious employers from state requirements to provide contraceptive services. Each
state has its own definition of a religious employer, thus, providing non-uniform
protection to both women who desire these services and employers who feel their
freedoms are being violated.
The tension between gender equality and the Free Exercise clause is wellillustrated in California, where a religious entity has challenged legislation
mandating contraceptive coverage.2 The California legislature passed contraceptive
equity legislation3 that included a narrow conscience clause for religious employers.
The legislation allows a religious exemption for employers who meet the following
criteria: “(A) the inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity; (B) the
entity primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity; (C) the
entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the entity; and (D)
the entity is a nonprofit organization” as described in 26 U.S.C. 6033 (a)(2)(A)(i) or
(iii).4 Catholic Charities of Sacramento, a religiously funded charitable organization,
failed to meet the requirements of sections (B) and (C) of the California legislation
and filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the state statute that requires
employers that provide health insurance prescription coverage to include coverage
for contraceptives.5 On appeal from an initial denial of plaintiff’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, the California Third District Court of Appeals denied the
organization’s petition for a writ of mandate,6 holding that the trial court properly
denied the injunction, “since it was not reasonably probable that [the] plaintiff’s
action would prevail on the merits.”7 Catholic Charities appealed this decision to the
California Supreme Court; oral arguments were heard on December 2, 2003.8
The outcome of the Catholic Charities case could have a significant impact
nationally since many states either have or are considering adopting similar
legislation.9 In addition, the United States Congress is considering the Equity in
1
Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 425 (Cal. App. 3d
Dist. 2001).
2

Id.

3
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 2002); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10123.1969(d) (West 2002).
4

CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 2002); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10123.1969(d) (West 2002).
5

Catholic Charities, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 425.

6

Id.

7

Id. at 425.

8

California Supreme Court, available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/ (last
accessed February 18, 2003).
9
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Contraceptive Equity Bills Gain Momentum in
State Legislatures, (July 2003), available at http://www.crlp.org/pub_fac_epicchart.html (last
accessed October 8, 2002) [hereinafter Center for Reproductive Law and Policy].
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Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC),10 which, to ensure
passage, will most likely include some form of conscience clause.11
The Catholic Charities case calls into question the limits of the Constitution’s
Free Exercise clauses12 and reflects the conflict between the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.13 PDA of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects women from unequal treatment in
the workplace,14 while the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
provide citizens with the freedom to follow their religious ideals and the freedom
from state interference with religious practices.15
This note will attempt to address the interrelationship of the PDA and the First
and Fourteenth Amendments in the context of contraceptive equity legislation. To
that end, the note will examine states’ definitions of a “religious employer” and
make recommendations regarding statutory language that is broad enough to cover
those organizations with conscientious objections to contraception but narrow
enough to allow women to have ready access to contraceptive services. Following
this introduction, Part II of the note will provide background information about both
contraceptive equity and religious freedom. Part III will discuss current and
proposed contraceptive equity legislation in the states. Part IV will provide
recommendations for appropriate language. The conclusion is Part V.
II. CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A. Social and Economic Benefits of Providing Contraceptive Coverage
There are many social and economic benefits to providing contraceptive
coverage to employees. The proportion of women using birth control has been on
the rise since the 1980’s.16 By 1995, sixty-four percent of all women between the
ages of fifteen and forty-four were practicing some method of contraception.17 In
fact, for every ten American women who are sexually active, nine do not wish to
become pregnant.18 A woman who wishes to have only two children in her lifetime

10
Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage (EPICC) Act of 2003
S. 1396.15 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter EPICC].
11

Cheryl A. Danner, Prescription Contraceptives: Educate Yourself on the Discrimination
You May Be Suffering Because You Work for a Private Educational Institution, 31 J.L. &
EDUC. 513, 518 (2002).
12

U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, § 1.

13

Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(k) (1994).

14

Id.

15

U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV, § 1..

16

The Media Resource, News on the Horizon: Do Women Have a “Right” to Birth Control
Coverage in Their Health Plans?, available at http://www.mediastrat.com/pages
/n0102fact.html (last accessed Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter The Media Resource].
17

Id.

18

Megan Colleen Roth, Note, Rocking the Cradle with Erikson v. Bartell Drug Co.:
Contraceptive Insurance Coverage Takes a Step Forward, 70 UMKC L. REV. 781, 786 (2002).
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and who wishes to remain sexually active must use contraceptives for more than
twenty years of her life.19
Contraceptive coverage does not come without economic cost. The Women’s
Research and Education Institute has estimated that during a woman’s childbearing
years, her out-of-pocket health expenditures are sixty-eight percent more than those
of her male counterparts.20 Most of these costs are associated with reproductive
health care services, whether they be pregnancy-related or for contraception.21
Although contraceptive coverage is costly, using contraceptives saves health
dollars that would otherwise be spent to pay for the consequences of having
unprotected sex–unintended pregnancy and, depending on the method of
contraception used, sexually transmitted diseases.22 “Almost sixty percent of the 6.3
million pregnancies that occur annually in the United States are unintended”—higher
than any other developed country except France.23 More than half of all unintended
pregnancies occur among the ten percent of women “who report that they do not use
birth control.”24
Unintended pregnancy has a number of adverse consequences, including
increased infant morbidity and mortality, the financial costs of childbirth and the care
of distressed newborns, high rates of abortion, and limited women’s abilities to work
outside the home.25
Financially, unintended pregnancies take a significant toll on both personal
family wealth and national assets. “It was estimated that by 1990: “the nation will
have spent at least $2.1 billion in first-year costs alone to care for the excess numbers
of low birth-weight infants who need extensive medical care . . . . Reducing
unintended pregnancy is the single most effective means of reducing the number of
distressed, low birth-weight babies.”26
By reducing the number of unintended pregnancies, the United States can also
reduce the abortion rate.27 Nearly fifty percent of unintended pregnancies end in
abortion, equaling an estimated 1.4 million abortions a year.28 These abortions
impose physical and emotional costs on women.29 Easily available, affordable
contraception decreases the number of abortions.30
19

Id.

20

The Media Resource, supra note 16.

21

Id.

22

Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV.
363 (1998).
23

Id. at 364.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 364-65.

26

Id. at 365.

27

Roth, supra note 18, at 786.

28

Id.

29

Law, supra note 22, at 367.

30

Id.
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Women bear the brunt of the adverse social and economic consequences of
unintended pregnancy. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed that “[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic and
social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.”31 Unplanned and unwanted pregnancies hinder women and
prevent them from participating fully in society.
B. The Cost to Employers of Providing Contraceptive Coverage
Although there is a cost to employers of extending coverage for contraceptive
services, that cost is not significant. Adding coverage for the full range of medical
contraceptives—which includes birth control pills, implants, injections, IUDs or
diaphragms—would cost a total of $21.40 per employee per year, $17 of which
would be paid by employers, increasing an employee’s contribution by only $4.28
yearly.32 The actual cost is likely less because with adequate contraceptive coverage,
there would be fewer unintended pregnancies, which are costly to insurers and
employers alike.33 According to the Washington Business Health Group, providing
coverage for all contraceptive methods does actually reduces costs. The Group’s
study found that in a company of 80,000 employees—half of whom were women—
the overall per employee cost when the employer did not cover contraceptives was
seventeen percent higher than when the employer provided contraceptive benefits.
By factoring in costs of unintended pregnancies, the study found an average annual
direct cost per employee to be $431 if the employer provided contraceptive coverage.
In contrast, it would cost $494 a year if the employer excluded contraceptive
coverage.34 Thus, contraceptive coverage, according to this study, led to a fourteen
percent reduction in reproductive-related claims.35
C. Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
No federal law explicitly mandates prescription contraceptive coverage.36
Accordingly, there is no uniform, non-discriminatory prescription drug policy within
the insurance industry.37 It is, however, possible to interpret Title VII and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act to require such coverage.

31

505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).

32

The Media Resource, supra note 16.

33
Pregnancy itself creates costs to employers for time off, training for replacement
employees, among other costs.
34

The Media Resource, supra note 16.

35

More than two-thirds of women rely on private insurance to help them finance medical
care. The Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Research and Education Trust surveyed
employers in 2000 and found that there are notable gaps in coverage of oral contraceptives by
type of health plan. Among workers who had coverage under a health maintenance
organization (HMO), contraceptives were covered eighty-seven percent of the time. Workers
covered under conventional insurance plans had the least access to contraceptive services,
being covered only sixty percent of the time. See id.
36

Roth, supra note 18, at 789.

37

Id.
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In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which is the primary
federal anti-discrimination law.38 The goal of Title VII was “to end years of
discrimination in employment and to place all men and women, regardless of race,
color, religion or national origin, on equal footing in how they were treated in the
workforce.”39 Title VII, in its almost thirty years of existence, has been interpreted
to protect women’s reproductive health choices, primarily through the addition of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
D. Title VII and the PDA require contraceptive equity
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of race, sex,
religion or national origin.40 For many years, the relationship between pregnancy
and sex discrimination was ambiguous in the minds of judges interpreting Title VII,
since the statute itself did not even mention pregnancy.41 This relationship was
brought to the forefront of the national conscience with the United States Supreme
Court’s controversial decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.42
In Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that an employer’s short-term disability
policy that excludes pregnancy or pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage is not
discrimination on the basis of sex.43 The majority based its opinion on two findings:
(a) pregnancy discrimination does not “adversely impact all women and therefore is
not the same thing as gender discrimination; and (b) disability insurance which
covers the same illnesses and conditions for both men and women is equal
coverage.”44 Since men and women were treated facially equally, the Court held that
there was no discrimination.45 Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented
from this opinion and argued that “(a) women, as the only sex at risk for pregnancy,
were being subjected to unlawful discrimination; and (b) in determining whether an
employment policy treats the sexes equally, the court must look at the
comprehensiveness of the coverage provided to each sex.”46
In 1978, in response to General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, Congress clarified its
intentions regarding gender discrimination by amending Title VII to add the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA).47 In enacting the PDA, Congress adopted the
position of the dissenters in Gilbert by recognizing that sex-based differences existed
between male and female employees.48 In light of these differences, Congress
38

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003).

39

Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 2001).

40

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003).

41

Shannon Roberson Loeser, Gender Discrimination, the Pill & the High Cost of
Insurance, 1 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 125, 126 (2002).
42

General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).

43

Id. at 145.

44

Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270 (citing Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125).

45

Id.

46

Id. (citing Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125).

47

Id.

48

Roth, supra note 18, at 784.
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required that employers provide single-sex benefits where applicable.49 Essentially,
the PDA is a definition of terms and phrases within Title VII.50 It provides:
[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women . . . shall be treated the same for
all employment- related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work . . . .51
The Supreme Court further clarified the boundaries of the law as it related to
equality in insurance coverage.52 In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.
v. EEOC,53 a group of male plaintiffs sued their employer alleging that the
company’s policy of not providing pregnancy-related coverage to the spouses of the
employees violated the PDA. Because the female employees themselves had
pregnancy-related insurance coverage and because the female employees’ spouses
were fully covered under the insurance plan, the Court held that the employer’s
policy violated Title VII and the PDA.54 The Court reasoned that the company
provided men with less insurance coverage than they provided women employees
and that inequality of insurance coverage was a violation of the PDA.55
Another case that explored the limits of the PDA was Int’l Union v. Johnson
Controls.56 The employer, a battery manufacturing company, had a policy of
requiring only female employees to provide proof that they were not capable of
reproducing prior to being allowed to work with lead, which could potentially
damage a fetus.57 The Supreme Court found this policy to be a violation of the PDA,
holding that classification of employees based upon their ability to become pregnant,
whether or not an employee was pregnant, is sex-based discrimination.58 Thus, the
Court held that the PDA covers a woman’s potential to become pregnant, as well as
the pregnancy itself.
The PDA thus provides protection based on women’s capacity to become
pregnant and requires equal protection in terms of insurance coverage for individuals
of both genders. The statute does not, however, explicitly mention prescription

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2003).

52

Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.

53

462 U.S. 669 (1983).

54

Id. at 683-84.

55

Id.

56

499 U.S. 187 (1991).

57

Id. at 190.

58

Id. at 191-192.
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contraceptives.59 Therefore, it is unclear whether the denial of contraceptive
coverage is, in the words of the PDA, discrimination “on the basis of pregnancy.”60
E. The EEOC Decision
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the federal agency
charged with enforcing and interpreting Title VII and the PDA, issued a decision in
2000 which stated that “the PDA’s prohibition on discrimination against women
based on their ability to become pregnant thus necessarily includes a prohibition on
discrimination related to a woman’s use of contraceptives.”61 The EEOC issued this
ruling in a claim brought by two individuals who filed charges against their
employers alleging that the employers’ failure to offer insurance coverage for the
cost of prescription drugs and devices violated the PDA.62
In reaching its conclusion, the EEOC stated that “[c]ontraception is a means by
which a woman controls her ability to become pregnant.”63 The Commission
reasoned that because employers are not permitted to discharge employees from their
jobs because they use contraceptives, employers also “may not discriminate in their
health insurance plan by denying benefits for prescription contraceptives when they
provide benefits for comparable drugs and devices.”64
The EEOC also relied on language in the PDA that allows employers to limit
coverage for abortions. The EEOC concluded that Congress intended the PDA to
require that employers cover all pregnancy-related medical expenses unless the
statute provided an explicit exemption.65 Thus, if Congress had wanted to exclude
prescription contraception from coverage, it would have.66 Accordingly, the EEOC
ruled that by not exempting contraceptive services, Congress intended to include
contraceptive equity in the PDA.67
In addition, the EEOC stated that Congress clearly expressed an intention to
cover contraceptives in enacting the PDA.68 The Commission noted that in
Congressional debate members of Congress expressed that the PDA intended to
prohibit discrimination against women “based on ‘the whole range of matters
concerning the childbearing process’ and gave women ‘the right . . . to be financially

59

Roth, supra note 18, at 784.

60

Id.

61
Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception, 2000 WL 33407187 (Dec. 14,
2000).
62

Id. The insurance plans covered medical treatments and services, including prescription
drugs, yet excluded all types of prescription contraceptive drugs and devices, regardless of
their medical purpose.
63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id.
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and legally protected before, during and after [their] pregnancies.’”69 The EEOC
construed these Congressional statements to mean that inclusion of prescription
contraceptives was part of the “whole range” of the childbearing process, and that
Congress intended to include these devices under the PDA.70
F. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.
In 2001, the United States District Court in the Western District of Washington
heard Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.,71 a case of first impression in the federal courts
addressing “whether the selective exclusion of prescription contraception from
defendant’s generally comprehensive prescription plan constitutes discrimination on
the basis of sex.”72 Ultimately, the judge in Erickson held that the PDA does apply
to contraceptive equity claims.73
Jennifer Erickson, a twenty-seven year old pharmacist, was the lead plaintiff in a
class action suit brought against Erickson’s employer, Bartell Drug Company.74 The
company’s prescription drug plan for non-union employees specifically excluded
contraceptives, although it covered other prescription drugs, including many
preventative drugs and devices, such as blood pressure drugs, hormone replacement
therapies, and drugs to prevent blood clotting, among others.75 The court recognized
that the drug plan was part of the employees’ “compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment” that are protected under Title VII.76 Through analysis of
precedent-setting PDA cases and the meaning of Title VII, the court concluded that
Bartell Drug Company’s prescription drug policy was in violation of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.77
In its analysis, the court revealed that although employers do not have to cover
any contraceptive services, if they choose to provide prescription coverage, they
must provide equivalent insurance coverage for contraception.78
Because
prescription contraceptives are used only by women, the court stated that the
defendant’s choice to exclude the benefit from its generally applicable benefit plan
was discriminatory.79

69

Id. See also H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), 124 Cong. Rec. H38, 574
(daily ed. October 14, 1978) (statement of Rep. Sarasin, a manager of the House version of the
PDA).
70
Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception, 2000 WL 33407187 (Dec. 14,
2000).
71

141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).

72

Id. at 1268.

73

Id. at 1277.

74

Roth, supra note 18, at 785.

75

Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 n.1.

76

Id. at 1268 n.3.

77

Roth, supra note 18 at 789.

78

Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1272.

79

Id.
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In addition, the court noted that Title VII “requires employers to recognize the
differences between the sexes and provide equally comprehensive coverage, even if
that means providing additional benefits to cover women-only expenses.”80
While the decision in Erickson was a positive step for women seeking
contraceptive coverage, the PDA does not provide women who desire access to
contraceptive services with full protection against discrimination.81 For example,
Title VII and the PDA are only available to employees of companies with fifteen or
more employees,82 leaving women or the spouses of men who work for small
companies with no protection unless their state’s discrimination laws have a Title
VII analogue with a lower employee threshold. In the absence of an explicit statute
requiring contraceptive equity, women will have to bring claims under the PDA to
enforce their rights. Such claims are costly financially and emotionally. In addition,
women may find it difficult to locate attorneys willing to accept discrimination cases
in which the damages are so low.83
G. State Legislation
Many states have attempted to enact legislation to address inequities in insurance
coverage.84 These states have taken a variety of approaches in crafting legislation.85
The benefit of state legislation is that it directly mandates contraceptive equity;
however, such legislation often has its limitations. Depending on the language a
state adopts, women’s access may still be limited.86 For example, while most states
with contraceptive equity laws mandate that “any and all” FDA approved
contraceptives are covered, insurance companies may interpret this language to mean
“‘any’ and ‘all’ FDA approved categories rather than individual brands.”87 This
difference in interpretation can have a significant medical impact, particularly in
regard to the birth control pill.88
Also, oftentimes individual state laws only cover small employer-based/group
policies, individual insurance plans, and Medicaid.89 Employers who hold selfinsured plans can be exempted under the Federal Income Retirement Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), which preempts state legislation. In the best-case scenario, because
of these limitations, the maximum number of women who could benefit from state
legislation is thirteen percent.90
80

Id.

81

See Danner, supra note 11 at 515.

82

Id. at 516.

83

Id.

84

Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, supra note 9.

85

Id.

86

Danner, supra note 11 at 516-17.

87

Sarah E. Bycott, Controversy Aroused: North Carolina Mandates Insurance Coverage of
Contraceptives in the Wake of Viagra, 79 N.C. L. REV. 779, 805 (2001).
88

Id.

89

Roth, supra note 18 at 788-89.

90

Id. at 789.
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Sole reliance on state legislation to provide women with contraceptive equity
would also create an imbalance in coverage among citizens of different states, since
some states offer greater coverage than others, and some states offer no coverage at
all. With this lack of uniformity among the states, women will not achieve full
equality nationwide.91
H. Federal Contraceptive Equity Statutes
Given the limitations to state legislation, the best source of protection for women
would be at the federal level.92 Federal legislation could require that all employers
that provide prescription coverage extend the same benefits for contraceptive
services.93
Federal employees already reap the benefits of contraceptive equity. The Federal
Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP) was the first federal statute passed that
related to insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives.94 The FEHBP, also
called the “Lowey Amendment,” gave federal employees coverage of all five of the
FDA approved prescription contraceptive drugs and devices.
Members of Congress attempted to expand access to contraceptive equity to
private employers through the Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive
Coverage Act (EPICC),95 which was introduced in Congress in 1997, 1999 and 2001.
EPICC requires that if “a health insurance plan covers benefits for other FDA
approved prescription drugs or devices, it must also cover benefits for FDA approved
prescription contraception drugs or devices.”96 The act further requires that plans
that provide other outpatient services must also provide outpatient contraceptive
services.97 EPICC may be the answer to inequities in insurance coverage, but it has
yet to achieve passage in Congress.
I. Religious Free Exercise
Whether the efforts to provide equality in prescription contraceptive coverage are
made at the state or the federal level, all legislators are faced with the conundrum of
requiring equality while not running afoul of an employer’s right to religious free
exercise. America, a nation founded on the ideal of religious freedom, remains
wedded to the notion that the government should not intrude upon religious

91
See Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act: Hearings on
S. 766 Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Congress (1998) (statement
of Richard H. Schwarz, M.D., Chairman of the Dep’t of Obstetrics and Gynecology, New
York Methodist Hosp.).
92

Danner, supra note 11, at 518.

93

Id.

94
Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care System:
Viagra v. Birth Control, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 171, 196 (1999).
95

Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act, S.104, 107th Cong.
§ 704 (2001) [hereinafter EPICC].
96

Hayden, supra note 94, at 197.

97

Id.
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practice.98 The First Amendment of the Constitution explicitly states that Congress
shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.99 This freedom, however,
is restricted once one’s religious conduct begins inflicting harm on others.100
J. Extension of the First Amendment to State Action
The First Amendment originally applied only to the federal government.101 The
first application of the Free Exercise clause to the states was in 1940.102 In that year,
the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut held that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the religious liberty clauses of the First Amendment and rendered state
legislatures incompetent to enact laws that impinged on religious free exercise.103 In
1947, the Court held in Everson v. Board of Education104 that the First Amendment
“requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is
no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them”105
The Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut began articulating the situations
in which a state could take actions that would infringe on individuals’ free exercise
rights. The court distinguished religious belief from religious conduct, stating that:
[f]reedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be
restricted by law. On the other hand, [the First Amendment] safeguards
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment
embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first
is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society . . . . In every
case the power to regulate must be so exercised so as not, in attaining a
possible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.106
Cantwell made clear that while religious belief and speech are fully protected by
the Free Exercise Clause, religiously motivated conduct is entitled to less

98

April A. Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical
Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REV. 563, 568 (2002).
99

It should be noted that there are actually two clauses in the U.S. Constitution that relate
to religion; the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, both found within the First
Amendment. For my purposes, I will focus on the Free Exercise Clause, since the
establishment of a state religion is not what is implicated in legislation governing prescription
drug coverage.
100

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

101

Cherry, supra note 98, at 569.

102

Id.

103

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.

104

330 U.S. 1 (1947).

105

Id. at 18.

106

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
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protection.107 Thus, a state may regulate religiously motivated conduct so long as the
regulations are made only to protect society.108 “State regulations must be narrowly
tailored so as not to suppress the free exercise of religion or unduly censor religious
activity.”109
Many courts have applied Cantwell and have found that religiously motivated
conduct that inflicts harms on others is not protected by the Free Exercise doctrine.
For example, in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,110 the University attempted to
maintain its tax-exempt status despite its policies encouraging racial discrimination
in admissions, which it claimed were justified by the school’s religious beliefs.111
The Court reasoned that “not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional . . . . The
state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to
accomplish an overriding governmental interest.”112 Because racially discriminatory
schools “exert a pervasive influence on the entire educational process”,113 it was held
that denial of tax exempt status was an appropriate action and not in violation of the
Free Exercise clause.114
Historically, the Supreme Court used the compelling state interest test to
determine whether a state’s regulation was permitted. Under the compelling state
interest test, a state was constitutionally required to accommodate an adherent’s
exercise of his or her religious beliefs even when that exercise conflicted with a law
of general applicability, unless restricting the adherent’s free exercise was necessary
to serve a compelling state interest.115 This test was first applied in Sherbert v.
Verner,116 where the Court held that the state’s interest in preventing the filing of
fraudulent unemployment compensation claims was not compelling enough to
infringe on a citizen’s First Amendment rights.117 The plaintiff in Sherbert, a
Seventh-Day Adventist, was discharged from her job because she refused to work on
Saturday, her religion’s Sabbath day.118 This refusal to work on Saturdays led to her
inability to find new work and subsequent application for unemployment benefits.119
The state of South Carolina denied her unemployment benefits because she would

107

Id.

108

Cherry, supra note 98, at 576.

109

Id.

110

461 U.S. 574 (1983).

111

Id. at 577.

112

Id. at 603.

113

Id. at 604 n.29.

114

Id. at 605.

115

Cherry, supra note 98, at 579.

116

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

117

Id at 407.

118

Id. at 400.

119

Id.
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not accept suitable work when offered.120 The Supreme Court found that South
Carolina’s unemployment statute abridged the plaintiff’s free exercise of religion
because there was no compelling state interest involved in South Carolina’s
unemployment eligibility scheme.121 In Sherbert, the Supreme Court further noted
that even if the state had proven a compelling state interest, it would still be required
to show that there were no less restrictive means available to achieve its goals.122
Under this test, when a state was unable to demonstrate a compelling state interest,
the Court required the state to accommodate the believer’s exercise of religion by
exempting the believer from the regulation.123 Interests that have been found to be
compelling under this test include the payment of social security taxes,124 the
elimination of racial discrimination,125 and the assignment of social security
numbers.126
K. Current Interpretations of Neutral Laws of General Applicability
More recently, the Supreme Court retreated from the Sherbert line of cases and
limited the applicability of the strict scrutiny test. In Employment Division v.
Smith,127 the Court held that exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability
are almost never required under the Constitution.128 In Smith, two drug rehabilitation
counselors were denied unemployment benefits after being fired from their jobs at an
Oregon rehabilitation center.129 The employees were members of the Native
American Church, the adherents to which used peyote as part of their religious
practice.130 Since use of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, was against the state’s
controlled substance law, the state unemployment compensation agency denied the
employees’ unemployment claims, stating that the two had been discharged for
work-related misconduct.131 The plaintiffs claimed that the denial of unemployment
compensation for their religiously-motivated actions was a violation of their right to
free exercise. The Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise clause did not prohibit
the state from denying unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct
based on the use of peyote.132 It stated that:
120

Id. at 401.

121

Id. at 406-409.

122

Id. at 407.

123

Cherry, supra note 98, at 579.

124

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).

125

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).

126

Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).

127

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

128

Id. at 884.

129

Id. at 874.

130

Id.

131

Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 457.992(4) (1987); OR. ADMIN. R. 855-80021(3)(s)(1988)).
132

Id. at 885.
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[t]he government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions on
socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of
public policy, “cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental
action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.” To make an
individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law’s
coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is
“compelling”—permitting him by virtue of his beliefs, to become a law
unto himself,”—contradicts both constitutional tradition and common
sense.133
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, only three types of free
exercise claims remain subject to the compelling state interest test: (1) burdens that
result from non-neutral laws or laws that are not generally applicable; (2) hybrid
claims (where other constitutional violations are presented together with free
exercise violations); and (3) when the context of government action “lends itself to
an individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant
conduct.”134
With over twenty state contraceptive equity statutes and the possibility of a
federal statute in the future, the Court’s decision in Smith takes on added
significance. Smith is likely to determine the constitutionality of state and potentially
federal efforts to provide women with contraceptive coverage.
III. CURRENT AND PROPOSED CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY LEGISLATION
States have taken many different approaches to contraceptive equity statutes to
create a balance between the First Amendment and the equality mandate of Title VII.
Some states strike this balance with the use of “conscience clauses,” legislative
language which exempts those with religious objections to the policy from adherence
to the law. This section will survey states’ contraceptive equity laws and evaluate
their constitutionality.
Since 1998, twenty-one states have passed legislation related to insurance
coverage for contraceptives.135 Legislation of this type requires that employers who
provide prescription drug benefits to provide contraceptive drug benefits to
employees as well.136 Currently, eleven of those states have some form of
conscience clause for religious employers.137 These provisions identify the types of
private sector entities entitled to claim a conscientious objection to contraceptive
coverage, what grounds should form the basis of the exemption, and how the
deleterious impact of those objections on individuals needing contraceptive services

133

Id. (citations omitted).

134

Cherry, supra note 98, at 587-588.

135

Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Cover My Pills: Fair Access to
Contraception; Get The Facts, States with Laws Requiring Full Contraceptive Coverage
(1998-2002), at http:///www.covermypills.com/facts/states_law.asp (last visited Oct. 22,
2002).
136

Id.

137

Id.
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can be minimized.138 This latter language is important because an employer who
claims a religious exemption does so for all of its employees.139 For non-religious
employees of religiously-based hospitals or universities, an exemption can be quite
detrimental.
Statutory text in contraceptive equity legislation tends to fall into three
categories: those with no religious exemption, those with broad religious exemptions
and those with narrow religious exemptions. Some states include additional
protective language in their legislation to give female employees information about
their employers’ policies prior to employment.
A. No Religious Exemption
The first category of contraceptive equity legislation is that with no religious
exemption. States such as Georgia,140 Iowa,141 New Hampshire,142 Vermont,143 and
Virginia144 have no conscience clauses in their contraceptive equity statutes.
Representative text from Iowa states:
1. [A] group policy or contract providing for third-party payment or
prepayment of health or medical expenses shall not do either of the
following:
a. Exclude or restrict benefits for prescription contraceptive drugs or . . .
devices which prevent conception and which are approved by the [FDA]
. . ., if such policy or contract provides benefits for other outpatient
prescription drugs or devices.
b. Exclude or restrict benefits for outpatient contraceptive services which
are provided for the purpose of preventing conception if such policy or
contract provides benefits for other outpatient services provided by a
health care professional.145
States with no religious exemption in their contraceptive equity laws are at the
highest risk of having their laws deemed unconstitutional. Although these statutes
meet the requirements of Title VII, they ignore the very real religious imposition
they create. These laws, if challenged, are likely to be struck down because,
although they are neutral and of general applicability, they work to inhibit religious

138

Alan Guttmacher Institute, State Contraceptive Coverage Laws: Creative Responses to
Questions of ‘Conscience’ (1999) at http://www.agi-usa.org/pubs/journals/gr020401.html (last
visited Sept. 20, 2002).
139

Id.

140

GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6 (2004).

141

IOWA CODE § 514C.19 (2003).

142

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415: 18-i (2003).

143

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c (2003).

144

VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3 407.5:1 (Michie 2004).

145

IOWA CODE § 514C.19 (2003).
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employers’ free exercise by requiring employers to financially support a policy that
is against their religious beliefs.
For example, under the Iowa statute, Catholic churches and monasteries are
required to purchase benefit packages with contraceptive coverage for employees if
they also provide prescription drug benefits. This is most likely a violation of the
Free Exercise clause since it works to burden a religious entity by requiring a
practice which is in direct violation of the organization’s moral principles. Although
Smith146 greatly limited the scope of free exercise claims, the church would most
likely be able to assert a hybrid claim, stating that requiring contraceptive coverage
violates the church’s right to free speech.147 Refusal to support contraception could
be considered a form of political speech that can be linked to the free exercise claim
and render the statute unconstitutional.148 Although these types of claims are
controversial and not recognized by all courts,149 the United States Supreme Court150
and other courts have implicitly recognized their viability.151
B. Broad Religious Exemption
Other states take the opposite tack and offer very broad exemptions to employers
who find it morally objectionable to support contraception. Some states even go so
far as to allow insurers and health systems that are supported by religious
organizations an exemption from providing contraceptive coverage. Connecticut,152
Hawaii,153 Nevada,154 and Washington155 exempt both religious employers and
religious health care providers from providing contraceptives.
Representative text from Connecticut states:
[A]ny insurance company, hospital or medical services corporation, or
health care center may issue to a religious employer an individual health
insurance policy that excludes coverage for prescription contraception
methods which are contrary to the religious employer’s bona fide
religious tenets . . . (f) as used in this section: “religious employer” means

146

Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

147

Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1990).
148

Id.

149

See supra note 130.

150

Smith, 494 U.S. 872.

151

Even if this statutory language is not found unconstitutional under the U.S.
Constitution, it remains subject to state constitutions, which may require more stringent
interpretation of religious free exercise.
152

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-503e (2003).

153

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 431:10A-116.6, 431:10A-116.7 (Michie 2003).

154

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 695C.1715 (Michie 2004); see also § 695C.1717 (regarding
contraceptive health care services); § 689B.0376 (regarding group and blanket health
insurance and prescription drug coverage).
155

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.47.160 (2004).
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an employer that is a “qualified church controlled organization” as defined
in 26 U.S.C. section 3121 or a church affiliated organization.156
Legislation with such broad language places the greatest number of women at
risk of going without contraceptive coverage, since by allowing entire insurance
plans and religiously-based hospitals to avoid covering contraceptive services they
exclude a large pool of workers. Many of the hospital systems in the United States
have their roots in religion though they employ and serve individuals of every
religion.157 Also, hospital systems are in a process of change, becoming more
corporatized and offering individual patients less individual choice as to their
hospital and primary care physicians.158 Under legislation with broad exemptions,
non-religious employees of a large corporation with an insurance benefit plan tied to
a religiously-based hospital may be denied contraceptive coverage on the basis of the
insurance company’s religious beliefs. This type of legislation appears to be the type
of restriction that Cantwell rejected as religiously motivated conduct that inflicts
harms on others.159 In this situation, non-religious employees are harmed as a result
of their employer-provided insurance policy, which they had little or no choice in
negotiating or choosing. Such broad exemptions are not protected under the Free
Exercise Clause,160 and thus are likely to fail.161
Other states, like Delaware,162 Maryland,163 Missouri,164 and New Mexico165 offer
no definition of a religious employer. Representative text from Missouri states:
4. (1) Any health care carrier may issue to any person or entity...a health
benefit plan that excludes coverage for contraceptives if the use or
provision of such contraceptives is contrary to the moral, ethical,
orreligious beliefs or tenets of such person or entity.
(2) [exemption for enrollee for whom coverage is against moral or
religious beliefs]
(3) Any health carrier which is owned, operated or controlled in
substantial part by an entity that is operated pursuant to moral, ethical, or
religious tenets that are contrary to the use or provision of contraceptives

156

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-503e (2003).

157

William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations Upon Autonomous Moral
Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 456 (2001).
158

Id.

159

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296.

160

Id.

161

Erickson, 141 F.Supp. 2d 1266.

162

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3559 (2004).

163

MD. INS. CODE ANN. § 15-826 (2004).

164

MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1199 (2001).

165

N.M. STAT.ANN. § 59A-22-42 (2004).
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shall be exempt from the provisions of subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of
this section.166
These laws, if challenged, are likely to be struck down because they also do not
meet the test in Cantwell that requires religious conduct not to inflict harm on
others.167 Language such as the statute quoted above allows employers and service
providers with nonreligious, moral objections to contraception to be excluded from
the requirement of providing contraceptives. Such language subjects the statute to
analysis solely on the basis of Title VII, since the Free Exercise Clause is not
implicated when moral conduct, as opposed to religious conduct, is the basis of a
decision.168 Under statutes like these, employees of a non-religious business, the
owners of which opposed birth control would not have contraceptive coverage. For
example, Wal-Mart, one of the nation’s largest employers, has decided not to provide
birth control pills through their pharmacy. Under statutes like these, it is not
inconceivable that they would claim a moral exemption from the statute and leave
their employees without adequate contraceptive services. Again, Cantwell provides
less protection for religious conduct that inflicts harm on others,169 and requiring
large groups of non-believers to be burdened by their employer’s religious
convictions creates significant harm for the employees’ reproductive health and
imposes a financial burden upon them.
C. Narrow Religious Exemption
Some states provide a narrower exemption for religious employers.
California,170 Maine,171 North Carolina,172 and Rhode Island173 offer a religious
exemption that includes employers who primarily employ and serve those who
adhere to the religious tenets of the entity.
Representative text from California states:
(b)(1) For purposes of this section, a religious employer is an entity for
which each of the following is true:
(A) the inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity,
(B) the entity primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of
the entity

166

MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1199 (2001).

167

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305.

168

Because morality is not necessarily based upon religious beliefs, the First Amendment
does not apply to moral objections.
169

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305

170

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (2004).

171

24-A.M.R.S. § 2847-G (2003).

172

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178 (2004).

173

See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-19-48, 27-18-57, 27-20-43, 27-41-59 (2004).
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(C) the entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of
the entity
(D) The entity is a nonprofit organization as described in 26 USC section
6033(a)(2)(A)(i) or (iii).174
Legislative language offering a narrow conscience clause exemption is the most
likely language to withstand the requirements of both Title VII and the First
Amendment. Statutes with this type of language provide protection for religious free
exercise and run a low risk of harming those employees who do not adhere to their
employer’s religious tenets.
Under statutes like these, although a non-religious employee working for a
church would not have access to contraception, the harm would be minimal, since
any individual church’s non-religious staff is generally small. In addition, it is
unlikely that there are many church staff members who vehemently disagree with the
principals of their employer. Contrasted to the language of the broadly-defined
statutes, it is clear that a much smaller number of employees would face denial of
contraceptive coverage. In addition, employees who hold the same beliefs as their
religious employers could choose not to utilize their contraceptive benefits.
Large faith-based health conglomerates or service organizations, however, would
have to provide their employees with contraceptive benefits.175 This is the issue
brought up in Catholic Charities.176 The California Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court decision, holding that the California law is constitutional because it does
not interfere with religious free exercise. The law is neutral and of general
applicability and does not fall within any of the exceptions to the doctrine the
Supreme Court espoused in Smith.177 Organizations like Catholic Charities now have
two choices because the California Supreme Court has ruled against them: either
change employment policies and only employ members of the organization’s
religion, or provide non-religious employees with access to contraceptives.
D. Additional Protective Language
Some states additionally require that religious employers not offering
contraceptive coverage give employees notice of that fact. Representative text from
Hawaii states: “Every religious employer that invokes the exemption provided under
this section shall provide written notice to prospective employees prior to enrollment
with the plan, listing the contraceptive health care services the employer refuses to
cover for religious reasons.”178
This text does not violate either the PDA or the Free Exercise clause and allows
employees to be better informed before making employment choices. Although the
174

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (2004).

175
See Catholic Charities, 32 Cal. App. 4th at 527, 90 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2001), aff’d, 32
Cal. 4th 527 (Cal. 2004).
176

Id.

177

See Cherry, supra note 98, at 587-88 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
890 (1990)).
178

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10A-116.7 (2003).
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Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),179 the federal law governing
employee benefits, requires that employees receive understandable information about
their insurance coverage, this requirement is frequently ignored.180 Currently,
women often learn of their coverage limitations only after they have enrolled in the
plan or when they submit a claim and it is denied.181 Additional protective language
requiring notice of contraceptive coverage exclusions helps close the information
gap that is so prevalent in current insurance practice.
IV. STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN CONTRACEPTIVE EQUITY AND FREE EXERCISE
A tension most certainly exists between the goals of Title VII and the First
Amendment. This tension, however, is not irresolvable. To be sure, carefully
constructed contraceptive equity legislative language is capable of walking the
tightrope between the two principles.
There are several principles that should guide any efforts to achieve an effective
balance and ensure that religious employers’ rights to free exercise are not unduly
burdened.182 First, any proposed legislation must be neutral and of general
applicability.183 This means that conscience clauses should reflect a neutral stance,
both on their face and in spirit. The Court in 1993 in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hileah184 stated that neutrality ensures the protection of religious
minorities from discriminatory treatment. The Court’s interpretation of neutrality in
free exercise cases allows the state to place a burden on religious exercise only if the
object of the state action is not to burden religion, but instead an “incidental effect”
of the action.185
To avoid a “hybrid claim” under Smith, no other Constitutional rights can be
violated.186 Some courts reject the notion of “hybrid rights” claims,187 but assuming
the claims exist, any legislation must not have the effect of interfering with any other
Constitutional right, e.g. freedom of speech, or the Establishment Clause.188
Any proposed legislation must not single out any one particular religion.189
Lukumi involved a challenge to a city ordinance which prohibited the slaughter of

179

Law, supra note 22, at 387-88 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1)(1944)).

180

Id. at 387.

181

Id. 387-88.

182

U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV.

183

School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

184

508 U.S. 520 (1993) rev’d and remanded to 2 F.3d 369 (11th Cir. 1993)..

185

Cherry, supra note 98, at 573.

186

Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.

187

See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 702-707 (9th Cir.
1999), withdrawn, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs.,
5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
188

Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.

189

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hileah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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animals in “sacrifice” or “ritual.”190 The Court found that the language of the statute
was neutral; however, the record surrounding the city’s enactment of the ordinance
showed that the ordinance was intended to target the Santeria religion.191 Stating that
official action targeting religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded
by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality,”192 the court found a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause.193 Any language in contraceptive equity
legislation aimed at a specific religion or denomination will not pass Constitutional
muster.
The fact that a particular religion is burdened by a regulation is not evidence of
intentional targeting. This issue arose in the Catholic Charities case, where the
plaintiffs alleged that the Catholic Church was burdened more than other religious
denominations. In its petition to the California Supreme Court, the state of
California relied upon Reynolds v. United States,194 where the United States Supreme
Court upheld the right of Congress to criminalize polygamy, even though it burdened
Mormons more than other religious groups.195 Attorneys for the State of California
stated that
[A]t a minimum, Reynolds demonstrates that a neutral prohibition does
not become unconstitutional simply because of its disparate impact on a
particular religious organization. Absent proof that a particular religious
entity was unconstitutionally targeted, a valid and neutral statute survives
First Amendment review even if its enforcement burdens some churches
more than others.196
Lastly, any statute must be tailored so that any religious exemption does not
inflict harm on others who are non-adherents.197 As in Cantwell, the “religious
conduct” of excluding contraceptives from insurance policies must not harm nonadherents, otherwise it is not protected by the First Amendment.198
A. Recommendations for Appropriate Language
The best way to protect reproductive freedom as well as free exercise is to tailor
statutory conscience clause language to cover only organizations that primarily
employ and serve those who are their own adherents. The language of a narrow
religious exemption bridges the gap between Title VII and the First Amendment. By
providing access to prescription contraceptive coverage, the requirements of Title
190

Id.

191

Id. at 534.

192

Id.

193

Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 525, 535-38.

194

98 U.S. 145 (1879), overruled as stated in 745 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1984).

195

Id. at 161-67.

196

California Supreme Court Brief, Real Parties in Interest’s Answer Brief on the Merits.
No. S099822 [hereinafter State of California].
197

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296.

198

Id.
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VII and the PDA are met.199 Allowing religious employers an option to be excluded
from the legislation protects the employer’s right to free exercise.200 The narrow
exception does more, however, by ensuring that only those most likely to not desire
contraceptive coverage (i.e. religious adherents) are denied access to it.
Any broader exemption would be a violation of the test in Cantwell, which
requires that religiously motivated conduct not inflict harm on non-believers.201
With broad exemptions, non-religious employees of places like Catholic Charities or
religiously controlled hospital networks would not be entitled to contraceptive
coverage, which would impose a burden on these non-adherents. On the other hand,
the absence of any exceptions to contraceptive equity policy would likely render it
unconstitutional.202 The absence of exemptions would mean that individual
congregations, in their context as employers, would have to offer contraceptives to
their employees, causing them to support behavior that they see as morally repugnant
to their religious beliefs and violative of their right to freely exercise their religion.203
When states have attempted to pass equity legislation, the main objection they
face comes from religious employers who feel threatened by the idea of the state
requiring them to provide services that are in conflict with their religious practice.204
In debates prior to the enactment of California’s legislation, much of the discussion
centered specifically around crafting the language to provide for the needs of the
Catholic church, which had heavily lobbied against the legislation.205
Thus, for both political and constitutional reasons, states that are considering
contraceptive equity legislation should utilize a narrow exemption. Although state
legislation does not ultimately protect women as much as federal legislation,206 any
legislation giving women access to contraceptives is a step in the right direction.
Likewise, any federal legislation, such as the Equity in Prescription Insurance and
Contraceptive Coverage Act, should include a narrow exemption for religious
employers.207 Federal legislation is the best way to provide the greatest number of
women the greatest access to contraceptive coverage and a narrow religious
exemption will offer religious employers the free exercise protection they desire.
In addition, both state and federal legislation should include the additional
protective clause that requires employers to provide employees with information
about their access to contraceptive benefits. Inclusion of this clause offers women
critical information when they are making employment choices. Women who
receive this information prior to employment may opt to choose an employer who
199
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provides prescription contraceptives unlike the current situation where women often
accept a job only to find later that their contraceptive services are not covered under
the employer’s health benefit plan.208
Since Title VII only applies to employers with over 15 employees, it is important
that legislation provide protection for employees of smaller firms. To eliminate the
issue created by Title VII employer size limits, it is essential that enacted legislation
be available to employees of any size organization or business entity. It is estimated
that more than half of the workers in firms with fewer than 15 employees are
women.209 This means that approximately one-sixth of the nation’s women workers
are employed in such firms.210 Therefore, it is estimated that 7.66 million women are
employed by very small employers.211 State and federal contraceptive equity
legislation needs to provide all women with access to contraceptive services in order
to achieve the goal of contraceptive equity. Although excluding these 7.66 million
women from contraceptive services may seem to protect small business from
additional insurance costs, a closer look reveals that the slight cost of adding these
benefits will actually assist small business people in retaining employees and
reducing the costs associated with unwanted pregnancies.212 It is to a small
employer’s benefit to provide their employees with prescription contraceptive
benefits, since contraception will keep an essential employee from having an
unwanted pregnancy and being forced to take time away from their job. Prevention
of unwanted pregnancies is especially important in smaller companies, since there
are fewer available dollars for hiring temporary replacement employees or for lost
production costs during a full time employee’s pregnancy and maternity leave.
V. CONCLUSION
Women in United States do not receive equal treatment in their health insurance
coverage.213 Providing equal health care coverage is necessary to achieve equality
and to reduce the number of unwanted children and abortions.214
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its later-added corollary, the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, require equal access to contraceptive services even
when equal access requires additional cost for one gender.215 State legislation is
similarly limited in scope due to ERISA preemption rules.216 The proposed federal
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legislation, EPICC, is the most effective tool for protecting women against inequities
in their insurance coverage.217
Federal and state legislation, however, must not interfere with a religious
employer’s right to freely exercise its religion.218 The most effective way to balance
the ideals set forth in both Title VII and the First Amendment is to include a
conscience clause in contraceptive equity legislation. Narrowly-tailored legislative
language would provide the greatest number of employees with access to
contraceptives while protecting religious employers from government infringement
on their free exercise rights.
In addition to the conscience clause, legislation which requires employers
claiming conscience protection to provide employees with prior notice regarding the
lack of contraceptive coverage will offer these employees vital information when
making career choices.
Narrowly tailored conscience clauses in contraceptive equity legislation create a
bridge between the competing ideals of Title VII and the First Amendment. By
properly addressing both the need for contraceptive equity and the right to religious
freedom, contraceptive equity legislation that has a narrow religious exemption
strikes the appropriate balance between the interests of preventing unwanted
pregnancy and ensuring religious freedom.
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